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I
In the preface to his Maqās.id al-falāsifa (The Doctrines of the Philosophers),1 Abū H. āmid
al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) explains that this book is intended to act as a prelude to his
more in$uential work Tahāfut al-falāsifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers). Before
putting forth his refutation of many of the philosophers’ doctrines and arguments in the
latter book, he found it imperative, as he indicates, to expound them to the non-specialist
reader. This he does in a concise and neutral manner in the Maqās.id, which he divides
into three parts, on logic, metaphysics and physics, respectively. The philosophers’
 metaphysical doctrines, he writes, are mostly erroneous, their logic mostly correct,
whereas their physics contain a mixture of truth and falsehood. Truth, as he indicates in
the preface, will be sifted from falsehood elsewhere: ‘The erroneousness of [those
doctrines] that one ought to deem erroneous will be made clear in the Tahāfut.’2 A similar
point is made in the concluding statement in the Maqās.id:
This is all that we had intended to report (nah. kī) concerning [the philosophers’] disciplines of
logic, metaphysics and physics, without seeking to sift the good from the bad, or what is true
from what is false. After this, we will commence Tahāfut al-falāsifa, so that the falsehood of what
is false among these views becomes evident.3
It is widely accepted nowadays that the philosophical positions presented in the Maqās.id
often do not correspond to those criticized in the Tahāfut. This, however, will not affect
the argument of the present paper.
For the purposes of the present article, we need to underscore two distinct, but closely-
related elements in both the preface and concluding statement of the Maqās.id. First (the
second sentence in the above concluding statement), al-Ghazālī refers to his criticism of
the philosophers in the Tahāfut, indicating that that is his ultimate goal. He presents the
Maqās.id as being preparatory for that project, since it offers a comprehensive account of
the philosophers’ doctrines and thought. Second (the %rst sentence in the above
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3. Al-Ghazālī, Maqās.id (n. 2 above), pt. 3, pp. 76–7.
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concluding statement), he declares his adoption of a neutral and non-committal stance
in the Maqās.id, such that he presents his account of the philosophers’ positions without
passing judgement thereon. These two elements may seem inseparable: to undertake a
scholarly critical project, it makes good sense %rst to provide a neutral account of what is
being criticized. However, the opposite is not as obvious: adopting a neutral stance in
presenting the views of an  individual thinker or a school of thought does not necessarily
have to prepare for a criticism of these views, but could be undertaken for a variety of
other reasons.
On the basis of the prefatory and concluding statements, the Maqās.id was widely
believed to have been written immediately before the Tahāfut, which, according to a note
in one manuscript, MS Istanbul, Fatih 2921, was %nished in 488/1095.4 George Hourani
dates the Maqās.id to the period between 484/1091–2 and 486/1093–4.5 This early
dating has been contested of late, mainly since it has become clear that the philosophical
positions outlined in this book frequently diverge from those tackled in the Tahāfut.6
Jules Janssens argues that the earliest version of the Maqās.id should in fact be dated much
earlier than the Tahāfut. The book, he concludes, was written by the young al-Ghazālī
in his student days, when he ‘was probably an adept of the (Avicennan-inspired)
 philosophy of his time’.7 The preface and the concluding statement are explained as later
additions by al-Ghazālī postdating the Tahāfut.8 Yet another assessment is put forth by
Frank Griffel, who has recently suggested that the Maqās.id was written after the Tahāfut,
in the same late period in which al-Ghazālī wrote his al-Munqidh min al-d. alāl, i.e. around
501/1107. He supports this with three pieces of evidence: that ‘the Maqās.id refers
 explicitly to the Tahāfut, while the Tahāfut refers to many of al-Ghazālī’s books but not
to the Maqās.id’; that there are resemblances between the motifs and style of the preface
of the Maqās.id and the Munqidh; and that al-Ghazālī felt that some of his readers were
unprepared for the study of the Tahāfut, and later might have felt the need to write the
Maqās.id as a preparatory text.9
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4. M. Bouyges, Essai de chronologiedes oeuvres de al-Ghazali (Algazel), ed. M. Allard, Beirut, 1959, p. 23; also
al-Ghazālī, Tahāfut al-falāsifa [Algazel Tahafot al-falasifat], ed. M. Bouyges, Beirut, 1927, p. ix.
5. G. F. Hourani, ‘The Chronology of Ghazālī’s Writings’, Journal of the American Oriental Society, 79, 
1959, pp. 225–33 (227); id. ‘A Revised Chronology of Ghazālī’s Writings’, Journal of the American Oriental
Society 104, 1984, pp. 289–302 (292). Cf. A. Badawī, Muallafāt al-Ghazālī, Kuwait, 1977, pp. 53–62.
6. See, for instance, J. Janssens, ‘Al-Ghazzālī and His Use of Avicennian Texts’, in Problems in Arabic Philosophy,
ed. M. Maróth, Piliscsaba, 2003, pp. 37–49 (43–5); id. ‘Al-Ghazzālī’s Tahāfut: Is it Really a Rejection of Ibn Sīnā’s
Philosophy?’, Journal of Islamic Studies, 12, 2001, pp. 1–17.
7. Janssens, ‘Al-Ghazzālī and his Use of Avicennian Texts’ (n. 6 above), p. 48.
8. A similar view is arrived at by G. Reynolds (‘A Philosophical Odyssey: Ghazzālī’s Intentions of the Philosophers’,
in Medieval Philosophy and the Classical Tradition in Islam, Judaism and Christianity, ed. J. Inglis, London, 2002,
pp. 37–50 (45)), who also suggests the possibility that the preface and concluding statement were added by one of
al-Ghazālī’s disciples. I %nd this last scenario extremely remote.
9. F. Griffel, ‘MS London, British Library Or. 3126: An Unknown Work by al-Ghazālī on Metaphysics and
Philosophical Theology’, Journal of Islamic Studies, 17, 2006, pp. 1–42 (8–10).
In the present article, we will not seek to address the questions of the dating of the
Maqās.id and its relation to the Tahāfut or to other Ghazālian works, and hence will not
pass judgement on any of these three positions, since we are here mainly preoccupied
with the reception of the text. Notwithstanding, we need to consider the possibility that
the Maqās.id may have been written in stages and that, at an early stage, it may have lacked
the preface and concluding statement found in the text as we now know it, and thus
contained no suggestions that the ultimate goal of the book was to prepare for the
 criticism meted out against the philosophers in the Tahāfut. 
One piece of evidence that is often cited to corroborate this proposition is the fact
that the preface and concluding statement are not transmitted in the Latin translation.
Janssens argues that ‘the absence of the prologue is not necessarily the result of an
 historical misfortune in the transmission of the text, whether in the Arabic or in the Latin
tradition, or of any deliberate omission. It might simply re$ect the oldest state of the
text.’10 And Gabriel Reynolds writes:
With the exception of the preface and the conclusion, the Intentions reads as a systematic and
faithful exposition of philosophy. The preface and conclusion read as somewhat awkward appen-
dices. Could they be the work of a later redactor who sought to set the Intentions within the
greater context of Ghazzâlî’s career? Proof of this perhaps lies with the Latin manuscripts, which
by and large do not contain these appendices, most likely because the Intentions was translated
before they were added.11
The Latin translation, produced in Toledo in the third quarter of the twelfth century,
begins at the beginning of the logical part of the text,12 hence leaving out the book’s
 preface, and also does not transmit the last sentence appearing in the Arabic text, which
refers to the Tahāfut. Does the absence of these two parts in the translation suggest that
it may re$ect an earlier version of the text, and that the Arabic text as we know it
 preserves a later revision in which the preface and concluding statement were appended
to the body of the text? Or were these two parts simply removed shortly before, or during
the process of translating the text into Latin? We will return to this question a little
 further below.
The absence, in the Latin translation, of the preface and concluding statement, and
thereby of any references to the author’s criticism of the philosophers in another work
and of any indications that he was hardly committed to the book’s contents, resulted in
the book being widely perceived in medieval Europe as a compendium of Avicennan
philosophy, straight and simple. Algazel was seen as a philosopher and a faithful follower
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10. Janssens, ‘Al-Ghazālī’s Maqās.id al-Falāsifa. The Latin Translation’, in Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy,
ed. H. Lagerlund, 3 vols, Dordrecht, forthcoming.
11. Reynolds, ‘A Philosophical Odyssey’ (n. 8 above), pp. 43–4.
12. C. Lohr, ‘Logica Algazelis: Introduction and Critical Text’, Traditio, 21, 1965, pp. 223–90 (239);
 corresponding to al-Ghazālī, Maqās.id (n. 2 above), pt. 1, p. 4.
of Ibn Sīnā, exhibiting hardly any originality, not to mention any sign of the attitude
embodied in the Tahāfut.13 Only one extant Latin manuscript, MS Paris, Bibliothèque
nationale, lat. 16096, contains al-Ghazālī’s preface and concluding statement. However,
this more complete version dates to the late thirteenth century, and is thus considerably
later than the %rst and prevalent translation, and had minimal impact on the reception
of the Maqās.id and the image of its author in medieval Europe.14
By contrast, all Arabic manuscript copies of the Maqās.id known so far contain the
preface and conclusion which refer to the Tahāfut. It would appear that the reception of
this Ghazālian book in the medieval Islamic context was inseparably tied to the context
of its author’s own self-declared project of disputing with the philosophers. This,
however, was not the only way in which the book was received in Arabic, as will become
clear with a newly-discovered manuscript of the Maqās.id, to be described and discussed
next.
II
MS Dublin, Chester Beatty Library Ar 5328 is catalogued in Arthur Arberry’s Handlist
as a copy of the well-known philosophical text H. ikmat al-ayn by Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī
al-Qazwīnī (d. 675/1276–7).15 This attribution to al-Kātibī is based on two explicit
 indications in the manuscript of the identity of the text.
The recto of the $yleaf (fol. i) in this codex contains the foregoing title and author’s
name, written in a modern hand. The recto of the following folio, fol. 1a, is blank, except
for a note stating that the volume was owned by a certain Muh. ammad Alī ibn al-Shaykh
Uthmān al-Mut.abbib in Aleppo, apparently a physician, on whom I have found no
 information. The top margin of fol. 1b also contains the title, H. ikmat al-ayn, and the
three main parts comprising the text contained in the manuscript: logic, metaphysics and
physics. This, however, is in a later hand, which is evidently earlier than, and hence the
source of, the title and author’s name on the recto of the $yleaf, fol. i. The fact that the
parts indicated in the marginal heading on fol. 1b do not correspond to the contents of
al-Kātibī’s work (which consists of two parts, on metaphysics and physics, respectively)
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betrays the carelessness with which this heading was added. My guess is that the respon-
sibility for this heading most probably lies with a private or professional seller, who was
aware of the di)culty of selling a completely title-less book by an anonymous author.
The erroneous title and author’s name were simply reproduced by Arberry in his
Handlist, clearly without an adequate examination of the text, despite the availability of
another manuscript containing al-Kātibī’s H. ikmat al-ayn in the Chester Beatty Library
collection, MS Ar 3792, fols. 49b–111b, with which the text in MS Ar 5328 could have
been compared.
The manuscript does not contain a copyist’s colophon or any other clear indications
of when, where, by whom, or for whom the copy was produced. On the basis of the style
of naskh in which the text was copied, I estimate that the manuscript probably originates
from sixth/twelfth-century Syria or Iraq. It was clearly produced by a scholar, rather than
a professional scribe. Though having access to a complete copy of the manuscript, I have
been unable to examine it physically, and thus cannot rule out the possibility of %nding
further codicological evidence that could allow a different or more accurate dating.
As soon as the text is examined, it becomes evident that the manuscript is not a copy
of al-Kātibī’s H. ikmat al-ayn, but in fact a copy of al-Ghazālī’s Maqās.id al-falāsifa.
However, it is unique among other known Arabic manuscript copies of this book in that,
%rst, it is incomplete at both the beginning and the end, and second, the copy originally
bore neither a title nor an author’s name.
The text begins on fol. 1b, contrary to custom, without the basmala, any praise of God
(h. amdala) or of the Prophet, or any preface, but goes straight into a section on logic,
starting with its heading:
16
The text thus starts at the beginning of the %rst section of the logical part of the
Maqās.id,17 and omits both the preface and the introduction of the logical part, which
explains what logic is, its bene%t and its divisions. The text ends on fol. 105b as
follows:18
It is immediately striking that the absence of the title, author’s name and preface in this
copy cannot be due to any folios having gone missing from the beginning of the codex;
after all, the copyist started on fol. 1b and left fol. 1a blank. Nor is this omission due to
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16. I have added some hamzas and dots to the Arabic texts reproduced here.
17. Cf. al-Ghazālī, Maqās.id (n. 2 above), pt. 1, p. 5.
18. Cf. al-Ghazālī, Maqās.id (n. 2 above), pt. 3, pp. 76–7.
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Figure 1. The %rst page of text in MS Dublin, Chester Beatty Library Ar 5328 (fol. 1b).
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Figure 2. The last page of text in MS Dublin, Chester Beatty Library Ar 5328 (fol. 105b).
The folio has been affected by worming.
any folios having gone missing from the beginning of the exemplar, or an ultimate
 archetype, of this manuscript. For the text begins at a carefully chosen point, namely the
beginning of a section; moreover, the absence of the %nal sentence from the concluding
statement leaves no doubt that the omissions cannot be accidental.
So, if not by sheer accident, why then are these parts absent from the beginning and
end of this copy of the Maqās.id? Could these omissions, as one would instantly suspect,
expose a deliberate trimming at both ends of the text? The responsibility, in this case,
would lie squarely with either the copyist or the commissioner of the CBL manuscript,
or with the copyist or the commissioner of a possible archetype manuscript. Alternatively,
could this copy preserve a primitive version of al-Ghazālī’s text, which did not contain
the preface and concluding statement in the standard Arabic recension, but which al-
Ghazālī later revised mainly (if not solely) by appending these parts to indicate his later
critical and non-committal stance towards Avicennan philosophy?
Along the same lines, as has already been mentioned, one may then query the absence
of the preface and concluding statement from the Latin translation. Could the preface
and concluding statement have been omitted in the process of translating and publishing
the text in Latin? If, however, these omissions trace back to the Arabic manuscript source-
text of the Latin translation, then two possible scenarios present themselves: %rst, that
the Latin text preserves an earlier version of the Maqās.id, which was later revised by al-
Ghazālī; second, that the omissions are the responsibility of a copyist, or the com -
missioner, of an Arabic manuscript of the text. We should also consider the (rather
attractive) possibility that the copy from which the Latin translation was produced may
belong to a distinct family of manuscripts of the Arabic Maqās.id, to which the CBL
Arabic copy also belongs.
III
Now, to assess whether the absence of the preface and concluding statement from the
CBL copy stems from the author himself, or is the result of a later alteration of the text,
we need to take a closer look at the text of the Maqās.id. Without the preface and conclud-
ing statement, the Maqās.id will simply be a lucid and well-written compendium of
Avicennan philosophy; and indeed it has been shown that the text is essentially a trans-
lation of Ibn Sīnā’s Dānishnāme-yi Alāī, with adjustments, few important omissions
and only minor additions to the source text, some of which based on other Avicennan
works.19 However, it is not true that the stance that %nds expression in the preface and
concluding statement is echoed nowhere else in the body of the text. The beginning and
end of the Maqās.id are in fact not the only manifestly Ghazālian parts of the book; for
there are at least two other, less obvious places that bear a clear resonance with them in
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both their language and content. The %rst appears at the end of the logical part of the
work, where al-Ghazālī writes: ‘This is what we had sought to render comprehensible
(tafhīm) and to report (h. ikāya)’.20 So although al-Ghazālī, as he indicates in the preface
of the Maqās.id and in other works, is a %rm supporter of logic, his sole objective in this
book is merely to offer an account of the philosophers’ logic, and he thus refrains from
articulating even the few, generally minor points at which he departs from it. The second
place appears immediately afterwards, at the beginning of the metaphysical part, where
the author writes:
Know that their [i.e. the philosophers’] custom is to treat physics before [metaphysics]. However,
we have preferred to treat the present [subject, i.e. metaphysics] %rst, because it is more important
and controversy within it more widespread, and because it is the ultimate goal (ghāya) and
endpoint (maqs.ad) of the [philosophical] disciplines. It is treated after [physics] only because
of its obscurity and the di)culty of understanding it before understanding physics. However,
we will provide some [brief discussions of] physics intermittently throughout our discussion [of
metaphysics], which are necessary to make the meaning (maqs.ūd) [of the latter] comprehensible.
We will comprehensively report the topics of this discipline [viz. metaphysics] (nastawfī h. ikāyata
maqās.idi hādhā l-ilm) in two prefatory discussions and %ve sections.21
These two places lack any reference to the Tahāfut or to any intention on al-Ghazālī’s
part to criticize the philosophers elsewhere – this being one of the two salient elements
of the book’s preface and concluding statement, mentioned above. Nonetheless, these
four parts of the Maqās.id (the preface, concluding statement, end of the logical part, and
introduction of the metaphysical part) all make explicit the other feature, namely the
expression of the author’s non-committal stance vis-à-vis the contents of the book.
The two places in the text, just quoted, show that the author simply seeks to report
(h. ikāya) and to render comprehensible (tafhīm) the topics (maqās.id) discussed by the
philosophers. Note that ‘they’, the ‘philosophers’, are constantly spoken of in the third
person: an indication that al-Ghazālī neither commits himself to the contents of the
work, nor seems to mind portraying himself here as the reporter and expositor. Both
places, the end of the logical part and the introduction of the metaphysical part, are
 present in the CBL copy (fol. 21b). So is the %rst part of the concluding statement of the
text, which gives expression to this same non-committal stance: ‘This is all that we had
intended to report (nah. kī) concerning their disciplines of logic, metaphysics and physics,
without seeking to sift the good from the bad, or what is true from what is false’ (fol.
105b).
It would be counter-intuitive to imagine al-Ghazālī alluding, both in the body of his
book and at its end, to the purpose of his work and the stance he adopts therein, while
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20. Al-Ghazālī, Maqās.id (n. 2 above), pt. 1, p. 65.
21. Al-Ghazālī, Maqās.id (n. 2 above), pt. 2, p. 2. It should be noted that key elements in this passage are drawn
from Ibn Sīnā’s Dānishnāme, which too deals with metaphysics before physics; cf. Ibn Sīnā, Dānishnāme-yi Alāī,
ed. A. Khurāsānī, 2 vols, Tehran, 1936, vol. 1, p. 72.
omitting to make any mention of that at the beginning of the book (or, for that matter,
failing to provide a preface of any kind whatsoever). These hints within, and at the end
of, the book, at the author’s purpose, must be faint echoes of a point made at least as
clearly, if not in fact more pronouncedly, in the preface. And the fact that they exhibit
marked resonance with certain elements in the preface appearing in the standard Arabic
text of the Maqās.id makes it most likely that these elements in the preface were written
at the same time as the end of the logical part and the beginning of the metaphysical part
of the book. So we can safely conclude that the CBL copy does not represent an earlier,
Ghazālian version of the text of the Maqās.id, which lacked a preface, but is rather the
result of a later, post-Ghazālian alteration of the text.
Notwithstanding, this does not prove that the missing preface should also make refer-
ence to the Tahāfut, or that it must have been the same as the preface found in the stan-
dard Arabic text. So let us consider the following three possibilities:
i. that the earliest (and perhaps only) version of the Maqās.id that al-Ghazālī wrote
included the references to the Tahāfut at its beginning and end, and, at least in
that respect, is more or less the same as the text as we now know it;
ii. that the earliest version that he wrote made clear at the beginning, end and within
the text, the author’s neutral and non-committal stance, but contained no refer-
ences to the Tahāfut, and that these references in the preface and conclusion were
added by al-Ghazālī in a later revision;
iii. that the earliest version of the book did not contain any indications of the author’s
neutral and non-committal stance, whether at the beginning, end and within the
text, and that these, alongside references to al-Ghazālī’s criticism of the philoso-
phers in the Tahāfut, were added in a later revision by the author.
Possibility ii, as far as I am aware, has not been considered before; but, as with iii, it presup-
poses that the book was edited by its author and that its beginning and end underwent
considerable changes in the process. The only piece of evidence that, to my knowledge,
is cited to lend support to the notion that such an editorial process might have occurred
is the fact that the preface and concluding statement are not transmitted in the Latin
translation.22
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22. A previously unknown work by al-Ghazālī, one of his so-called ‘books that should be kept hidden from
those unworthy of them’ (al-kutub al-mad. nūn bi-hā alā ghayr ahlihā), has recently come to light with the publi-
cation of a facsimile of a manuscript from a private collection in Iran (published by N. Pourjavady as Majmūah-
ye Falsafī-e Marāghah: A Philosophical Anthology from Maraghah, Tehran, 2002, pp. 2–62). In relation to this,
F. Griffel writes that the manuscript ‘attributes a version of the Intentions of the Philosophers to al-Ghazālī without
mentioning that the teachings therein are an uncommitted report’ (‘Al-Ghazali’, Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, %rst published online on 14 August 2007). However, although drawing heavily and selectively on the
Maqās.id, this shorter text is evidently a very different work. It contains major omissions (most obviously, the begin-
ning of the text corresponds to Maqās.id (n. 2 above), pt. 2, p. 59) and additions in both structure and content.
Furthermore, the title, preface and objectives of the text are all at variance with those of the Maqās.id. It is, therefore,
a completely other and, in all likelihood, later work, which on no account could be treated as a version of The
Doctrines of the Philosophers.
This evidence is inadmissible. For the Latin translation, too, contains the concluding
statement appearing at the end of the logical part and the introduction of the meta -
physical part, both of which, as we saw, are intimately tied, in style and content, to
elements in the preface and concluding statement as found in the standard Arabic text.23
On their own, however, these two places in the body of the text could hardly have raised
any suspicions and implied that the author might not have been entirely committed to
its contents. So it appears that rather than preserving an earlier, Ghazālian version of the
Maqās.id, the Latin version too indeed exhibits evidence of a later alteration of the text.
It follows that the thesis that al-Ghazālī %rst wrote the Maqās.id and then edited it to
connect it to the Tahāfut cannot be supported by any textual evidence from within the
book itself, nor, to my knowledge, has it been substantiated by a robust argument of any
sort. Propositions ii and iii above appear highly conjectural.
IV
Although both the CBL copy and the Latin translation lack the preface and part of the
concluding statement, the two versions are not related. The two texts, %rst of all, do not
share the same starting point: the Latin translation contains the introduction to the logi-
cal part of the book (containing a discussion of what logic is, its bene%t and its divisions),
but this introduction is absent in the CBL copy, which begins at the %rst section of the
logical part. This discrepancy, alongside a major textual defect from which only the CBL
copy suffers,24 excludes the possibility that this manuscript could be a source for the Latin
translation.
Moreover, the two versions of the text end at two different points. The CBL copy
ends thus: ‘This is all that we had intended to report concerning their disciplines of logic,
metaphysics and physics, without seeking to sift the good from the bad, or what is true
from what is false’. Part of this statement, namely ‘without seeking to sift the good from
the bad, or what is true from what is false’, is missing in the Latin translation.25 It follows
that the Latin translation cannot represent an earlier, amended Arabic version, which
underwent a later amendment represented by the CBL copy. The two texts, therefore,
must be the outcomes of two independent amendments made to the Maqās.id by two
different individuals or parties.
This brings us to why the beginning and end of the Maqās.id are absent from the
Latin translation and the CBL copy. Why were they removed? The obvious
explanation is that these parts sit uncomfortably with the body of the work: they are
the only properly Ghazālian parts of the book; the rest is Avicennan. For the author
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declares that though the book seeks to set out the philosophers’ positions in a neutral
manner, its ultimate purpose is to criticize these philosophers and to refute many of
their positions. The  preface and concluding statement thereby contextualize the work
squarely within al-Ghazālī’s wider intellectual project. The reader, whether medieval
or contemporary, cannot help but constantly be mindful of both the author’s lack of
commitment to the book’s contents and the spectre of the Tahāfut looming in the
background. For a non-Ghazālian Avicennist, this would have been an irritating and
distracting feature of the text, which undermined, and detracted from, its potentially
useful philosophical content.
The reception of the Maqās.id has to be considered in the context of the reception of
al-Ghazālī’s broader theological ‘project’, in which the book served a relatively peripheral
role. This project was met with both opposition and competition. The opposition came
from those falāsifa who resisted the increasing interaction between falsafa and kalām
from the sixth/twelfth century onwards. And it is most likely a member (or possibly a
group) from this trend who was responsible for producing the CBL copy and for the
removal of the offending Ghazālian parts at the beginning and end of the text. Even the
title and author’s name had to be removed to decontextualize this Ghazālian work
completely and to use it simply as a compendium of Avicennan philosophy. This had to
be done at the expense of leaving the text anonymous: not a major sacri%ce considering
that the copy appears to have been produced by a scholar for his own private use. 
The introduction of the logical part, though essentially Avicennan, appears to have
been removed for the same reason. For to illustrate some general logical points, al-Ghazālī
allows himself here to use, as particular examples, the three doctrines that, for the rejection
of which, he accuses the philosophers of unbelief at the end of the Tahāfut. These are
the temporal generation of the world, the bodily resurrection of human beings, and the
doctrine that acts of obedience will be rewarded in the afterlife, and acts of disobedience
punished, which presupposes that God knows particulars.26 None of these Ghazālian
examples, which unmistakably recall the stern verdict made in the Tahāfut, have a place
in a proper Avicennan text.
The removal of the preface and concluding statement in the Latin translation can
similarly be explained as an attempt, again, to decontextualize the book. By contrast to
the CBL copy, the author’s name was kept primarily because medieval European readers
were so oblivious to who Algazel really was, and secondarily because of the extreme
 di)culty of publishing an anonymous work. The fact that the author’s name was
preserved indicates that the missing parts were removed in the process of translating and
publishing the book, and were not already absent from the Arabic manuscript from which
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not, to my knowledge, been considered in discussions of the dating of the latter work. This connection seems to
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the translation was made. For it would be quite senseless for anyone seeking to
 decontextualize the Arabic text to remove only the beginning and end of the text while
keeping al-Ghazālī’s name as the author. The introduction of the logical part, with its
veiled hints at the verdict of unbelief made against the philosophers in the Tahāfut, was
also kept, since the Latin reader was unaware of the latter text, and thus, unlike the
medieval Arabic reader, would not have discerned these insinuations.
As for the competition to al-Ghazālī’s project, this came from later philosophical
Asharism, initiated most de%nitively by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210). The
 deliberately fragmented and multilayered nature of al-Ghazālī’s thought made it unwieldy,
relatively inaccessible and hard to encompass and imitate. He himself avoided popularising
his thought in its totality, and divulged some aspects thereof in works that, he advised, should
only be read by the adept few. These works survive in relatively few manuscripts. None of
al-Ghazālī’s widely-read books offered a rounded systematic summary of his theological
and philosophical thought. His major work dealing with philosophical matters, the
Tahāfut, seeks to refute various aspects of the philosophers’ thought, and at the end declares
them unbelievers, but does not offer a positive  alternative. The Tahāfut ‘tactical module’
of al-Ghazālī’s project seems to meet success during the sixth/twelfth century, when some
lesser-known thinkers, most importantly Sharaf al-Dīn al-Masūdī and Ibn Ghaylān al-
Balkhī, attempt to take it forward.27 However, the Ghazālian style of philosophical theology
became outdated towards the end of this century, as a much more systematic, accessible and
con%dent tradition of Asharī philosophical theology emerged. Unlike al-Ghazālī, al-Rāzī
never instructs that any parts of his thought or any of his works should remain hidden from
the majority, and on the whole shows no qualms about expressing his indebtedness to al-
Shaykh al-Raīs and the Falāsifa in general.
From the sixth/twelfth century onwards, the works of Ibn Sīnā started to be taught
in Asharī circles and madrasas,28 and Asharī works became highly philosophical. Despite
the fact that al-Ghazālī himself had an in$uence on the wave of greater Asharī openness
towards Ibn Sīnā,29 there was no longer a need for the Maqās.id as such. So while the Latin
and Hebrew translations met with great success, the Arabic version appears to have had
a very modest circulation, as can be evidenced from the extreme rarity of the references
it receives in later sources, the relatively small number of extant manuscripts, and the less
important, though not inconsequential, fact that it has never been commented on. Apart
from those found in biographical and bibliographic works, references to the work are
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extremely scarce and, on the whole, of little import: for instance, Ibn Rushd (d.
595/1198) and Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), critics of both Ibn Sīnā and al-Ghazālī,
refer to the work in a very cursory manner, recognising it as a compendium representative
of Avicennan philosophy.30 Yet, as the CBL copy and the Latin translation show, some
felt that the Maqās.id could still be put to use, but only if thoroughly decontextualized.
APPENDIX: THE INTENTIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHERS OR THE DOCTRINES OF THE
PHILOSOPHERS?
It has been customary to render the title Maqās.id al-falāsifa as The Intentions of the
Philosophers or sometimes The Meanings of the Philosophers, The Aims of the Philosophers
or The Goals of the Philosophers. This contemporary convention agrees with the medieval
Latin translation of the title provided in the late thirteenth-century MS Paris,
Bibliothèque nationale, lat. 16096, the only Latin manuscript in which the preface is
transmitted, namely De philosophorum intentionibus.31 This rendering, in turn, has a
precedent in the introduction to the metaphysical part of the book in the earlier, late
twelfth-century Latin translation, where maqās.id hādhā l-ilm is rendered as
 ‘intencionibus huius divine sciencie’.32 Notwithstanding, the latter translation of the
book is entitled Summa theoricae philosophiae, which has always been perceived by
contemporary historians as a convenient alternative replacing the original Arabic title,
deliberately introduced by the translators in line with the decontextualising omissions
they made at the beginning and end of the text. Lohr, for instance, describes De
philosophorum intentionibus as ‘the true title’.33 As I hope will become clear in what
follows, Summa theoricae philosophiae is in fact a much more faithful translation.
The word maqās.id, as for instance in al-Ghazālī’s title, is the plural of maqs.ad (the
noun of place), not maqs.ūd (the passive participle), the plural of which should be maqās.īd.
The word maqs.ūd can mean ‘intention’ or the ‘intended meaning’ of something said or
written, but is subtly different from the word manā. The latter should be attributed to
the text (e.g. manā l-kalām), whereas maqs.ūd can be attributed to either the text or the
author (e.g. maqs.ūd al-faylasūf = ‘what the philosopher intends, or means’). Al-Ghazālī
himself uses this word in the introduction to the metaphysical parts of the book: ‘[W]e
will provide some [brief discussions of] physics intermittently throughout our discussion
[of metaphysics], which are necessary to make the meaning (maqs.ūd) [of the latter]
comprehensible.’34
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30. Ibn Rushd, Tahāfut al-tahāfut [Averroès Tahāfot at-Tahāfot], ed. M. Bouyges, Beirut, 1930, p. 391; and
Ibn Taymiyya, Al-Radd alā l-mant.iqiyyīn, ed. S. . al-Kutubī, Bombay, 1949, p. 336.
31. Salman, ‘Algazel et les latins’ (n. 14 above), p. 125.
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33. Lohr, ‘Logica Algazelis’ (n. 12 above), p. 229. 
34. Al-Ghazālī, Maqās.id (n. 2 above), pt. 2, p. 2.
Now let us turn to maqs.ad. Commenting on the title of al-Ghazālī’s work, Duncan
Macdonald writes:
The word ‘meanings’ in its title is used much in the same way as in the title of Charles Kingsley’s
pamphlet, ‘What, then, does Dr. Newman mean?’ This is what the philosophers ‘meant’. A
maqs.ad is what is intended or meant. Maqs.ad al-kalām is ‘the intended sense of the saying’. The
word is thus a synonym of manā in the sense ‘meaning’ or ‘idea’.35
This effectively equates maqs.ad with maqs.ūd. Yet, in contrast to the latter, the former
generally does not have an interpretive connotation, but rather means ‘goal’, ‘destination’
or ‘objective’. So, though maqs.ad al-kalām means ‘the objective (hence ‘meaning’) of
speech’, maqs.ad, on its own, does not normally mean ‘meaning’ or ‘intention’. Maqs.ad
al-faylasūf will not mean ‘the intention of the philosopher’, or ‘what the philosopher
means’.
The word, in fact, has an almost technical sense in theology and other disciplines.
Maqs.ad, in these contexts, normally means ‘topic’, i.e. a subdivision within a discipline,
which serves to address one or more of that discipline’s objectives. It is, therefore, more
or less the same as mabh. ath and mat.lab. There are countless examples of the expression
being used in this sense, including in book titles and section headings; e.g. al-Ghazālī’s
own book al-Maqs.ad al-asnā fī sharh. asmā Allāh al-h. usnā, al-Taftāzānī’s (d. 791/1389)
work Maqās.id al-t.ālibīn, and the use of maqs.ad in section headings in al-Ījī’s (d.
756/1355) Mawāqif. In the introduction to his work on the theory of jurisprudence, al-
Mustas.fā, al-Ghazālī writes that the book covers all the topics of that discipline ( jamī
maqās.id hādhā l-ilm).36
The expression maqs.ad is sometimes used in a narrower, but clearly related sense,
namely ‘doctrine’ or ‘thesis’, which is a theologian’s endpoint, or conclusion, arrived at
within a given topic. This usage appears, for instance, in the distinction that Sayf al-Dīn
al-Āmidī (d. 631/1233) makes between the doctrine that the proving of which is sought
(maqs.ad) and the routes through which the doctrine is proved (maslak, pl. masālik).37
It is in these senses, ‘topic’, ‘doctrine’ or ‘thesis’, that al-Ghazālī uses maqs.ad and
maqās.id in The Doctrines of the Philosophers, including in the title. In the preface, he
describes his work as containing a ‘report of [the philosophers’] doctrines (maqās.id) in
their disciplines, namely logic, physics and metaphysics’.38 And in the introduction to
the metaphysical part, he writes that he will provide a report of all the topics (maqās.id)
of this discipline.39 Rather than writing an ‘introduction’ or a ‘companion’ to the
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 philosophers’ works, which explains them and makes them more accessible, and which
may potentially invite the readers to read these other philosophical works, as may be
suggested in the title The Intentions of the Philosophers, al-Ghazālī only provides a very
digestible summary of the topics the philosophers investigate and of their doctrines. With
Summa theoricae philosophiae, the twelfth-century translators of the Maqās.id were right
on the mark.
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